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Core or Cafeteria?
In considering how development studies can best be
taught at the postgraduate level, one question which
arises at a very early stage of curriculum planning is
whether the subject has an intellectual core.1 There
are at least a hundred different ways in which one
might design a postgraduate course in the subject.
But these hundred or so designs can be divided into
two main groups. One group follow what has been
called the 'cafeteria principle', ie allowing a student
to choose any combination of the course elements
that are on offer, no matter how apparently bizarre;
the other group follows the 'core principle' ie com-
pelling a student to study one prescribed element or
combination of elements as a condition of qualifica-
tion. The issue addressed here is whether there are
good reasons for preferring the core to the cafeteria
principle, and, if so, which course elements ought to
be included in the core of development studies.
A number of unsatisfactory reasons for embracing
either principle may be usefully cleared away at the
start. The cafeteria approach may be very popular
with students and staff, and its popularity with stu-
dents may be used to win over staff, while its popu-
larity with staff may lead to its acceptance by stu-
dents. But it may be popular with either for the
wrong reasons. The students may be calculating that
it gives them the opportunity to choose those course
elements that are the least demanding in terms of
individual effort required to achieve pass level. As
long as this level cannot be equalised over all course
elements, this temptation will remain strong, not
only among the weak and poorly motivated but also
among the bright, well-motivated students who are
reluctant to put themselves at a competitive disad-
vantage.
The staff may at the same time be calculating that
the cafeteria principle is a useful device for accom-
modating their disagreement over which are the
essential elements of a development studies course.
Such disagreement is perhaps more likely in
development studies than in longer established areas
of enquiry. It may be reinforced to the extent that a
course is being planned around a staff with given
specialist interests (as is usually the case) rather than
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designed in the abstract, in advance of recruiting the
appropriate specialist teachers. The cafeteria princi-
pie avoids giving any one course element, and there-
fore any group of staff members, an entrenched or
privileged position vis-à-vis all the others, and is less
contentious for that reason.
There are unsatisfactory reasons for espousing the
core principie also. The balance of pedagogical prac-
tice has swung back in favour of cores in recent
years, and those who are impressed by argument
from precedent or authority may be inclined to cite,
for example, the recent retreat by Harvard and
other US universities from the practice of allowing
students unrestricted free choice in the make-up of
their required total of course credits. On the whole,
fashions are best ignored, and since arguments from
precedent rarely involve exact analogies, they beg
the question of why that particular precedent is to be
accepted as relevant.
Part of the recent revival of the core principle in
postgraduate courses in the UK must have derived
from the well-known preference for cores of major
grant-giving agencies such as the Social Science
Research Council. But it would reveal excessive
confidence in bureaucratic wisdom (even when for-
tified by panels of academic experts) to argue that it
is right to have a core because granting institutions
prefer it that way. The basis of their preference
seems to be a concern for standards. Specifically,
they take the view that every student should be
evaluated against every other by some common
yardstick, and the core elements of a course conve-
niently provide such a yardstick. Grantgiving
institutions are suspicious of cafeteria courses
because they permit soft options, and so they insist
on cores for the same reasons that students incline to
oppose them.
In describing these as unsatisfactory reasons for pre-
ferring one principle to another, a clarification
should be made. It is not implied that such consider-
ations should never be allowed to intrude on course
planning: in practice it is extremely difficult to pre-
vent their doing so. They are, however, to be
regarded as reasons of prudence, not reasons of
right. As such, their place is as possible constraints
on the feasibility of a preferred design, not as its
primary determinants. These prudential considera-
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tions are matters of judgement in particular educa-
tional contexts. There is nothing that one can say in
general about the extent to which such pressures
have to be accommodated.
Two issues of principle enter into the core/cafeteria
debate. They are related, but should first be looked
at separately. The first is whether, at the graduate
level, students ought to be completely free to choose
their areas of study. The second is whether teachers
know enough to be able confidently to prescribe a
core, supposing that the freedom of choice principle
is to be disregarded. The relation between the issues
is that a sceptical view of the second question would
reinforce a defence of free choice: while a conviction
that free choice was untenable as a principle would
encourage us to take a more sanguine view of such
knowledge as we have, and the possibility of fashion-
ing a core from it.
Should then graduate students in principle be free to
select their options? An undiluted affirmative is
surely difficult to sustain. If there is agreement that
students should have no control over what items
appear on the menu in the first place, it is difficult to
make a principled argument that no further limita-
tions on choice should be introduced. The argu-
ments to favour maximum freedom of choice from a
given menu also favour student freedom to write the
menu and indeed the kind of arguments used by
Illich 1973} against all existing arrangements for
formal education. People engaged on curriculum
planning are ipso facto denying the validity of such
arguments.
A more limited argument is that, being graduates,
the students concerned already know the basics of
the subject, and by this stage in their study are only
concerned with acquiring some of the range of
optional extras. Thus it is foolish to attempt to regi-
ment them after they have reached a certain level of
knowledge and competence. This claim may be valid
for postgraduate courses in certain subjects. One
thinks particularly of the MPhil degree in economics
at Cambridge. In this case, the standard required for
admission is exceptionally high, and students come
with very clear ideas of the specialist subject which
they wish to study, and the particular teachers under
whom they wish to study it. They have already
developed a clear orientation towards a particular
sub-area of economicsthe history of economic
theory, mathematical economics, development
economicsand want to hear a preferred teacher's
treatment of them. In this situation, insisting that all
students take a course in theory or econometrics
does seem an unjustifiable intrusion on their free-
dom of choice.
The Nature of Graduate Development Studies
However, the teaching of development studies at the
postgraduate level is not comparable. (Development
studies are taught at the undergraduate level at only
seven UK universities, only one of which, the Uni-
versity of East Anglia, grants an undergraduate
degree in the subject.) Consequently, students at the
postgraduate level do not normally begin from an
established base of understanding. On the contrary,
they are recruited from a very wide range of under-
graduate disciplines, such as geography, sociology,
anthropology, economics, politics, engineering and
sometimes even mathematics and natural sci-
encesnone of them centred specifically on the con-
cept of development. To permit immediately a free
choice of specialisms within development studies
would therefore seem to be premature. It clearly
implies that the subject is only a rag-bag of applica-
tions (either to developing countries, or to develop-
ing areas in developing countries) of a whole range of
disciplines. If this were true, there would be no need
to organise the teaching of development studies as
such; the required coordination of disciplinary appli-
cations could be achieved equally well through
centres of area studies.
It follows that a defence of the core principle cannot
be made without taking a position on the nature of
development studies itself. The best justification for
teaching a core is that the subject actually has a core,
with which postgraduate students cannot be
expected to be already familiar. So we are led to
take up the second issue of principle mentioned ear-
lier, namely, do we know enough to be able confi-
dently to prescribe a core? The answer proposed
here is an affirmative, though an affirmative given
with rather more trepidation than confidence.
Development studies has as its core three elements,
the first theoretical or philosophical, the second
empirical or historical, and the third practical or
technical. In suggesting a theoretical core, one is
likely to be misunderstood in quite a few different
ways. At one extreme, it might appear as a claim
that we already have a grand theory of development,
accepted by consensus as the correct conceptual
macro framework. Very few would be likely to
endorse such a claim. Grand theory is not lacking,
but it is plural rather than singular: it is the work of
many handsKuznets, Rostow, Lewis, Bauer,
Baran, Frank, Amin, Lipton and many more. At the
other extreme, to say that development studies has a
theoretical core may be taken to mean that the
theoretical foundations of the related discip-
lineseconomics, politics, sociology, geography,
anthropology, engineering, agronomy, etccan
either be amalgamated or at least juxtaposed within
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some meaningful framework to redeem the claim of
development studies to inter-disciplinarity or
multi-disciplinarity. There are good reasons for dis-
regarding disciplinary boundaries in particular
analyses, so that development problems are often
best tackled by methods which are inter-disciplinary
[see Lipton 1970, Moore 1974]. However, inter-
disciplinarity in that sense is quite different from the
notion of an amalgam of relevant disciplines; indeed
throughout, it accepts the integrity of the separate
disciplines and discusses how to apply them to the
somewhat intractable reality of less developed coun-
tries.
What then is the theoretical element in the core of
development studies? The starting point is the very
plurality of theories of development which has
already been noted. This plurality confronts stu-
dents with a problem of discrimination and of
choice. Are all these theories of development saying
the same thing, but in different words? Can one
group the theories into families, and, if so, what are
their family characteristics? Is it necessary to iden-
tify which family theories, or which particular
author's theory, seems valid at a broad level? Is it
necessary to embark on a personal reconstruction of
theory? Do any of the theories have any connection
with practical policies in the development field or
with the content of research programmes?
To teachers of development studies, these questions
may seem very naïve, and many may be confident of
their ability to offer clear and cogent answers. On
the other hand it would not be difficult to point to
examples of distinguished teachers, including some
professors, in whom such confidence would be mis-
placed. One frequent approach is to regard
development theory as a patchwork quilt, to which
each of the great names has contributed his own
little square; what could be incongruous in stitching
together the ideas of Lewis with those of Baran, or
the ideas of Kuznets with those of Frank? Another
frequent approach is to dismiss the different concep-
tualisations which each successive theorist brings as
the swings of intellectual fashion, unrelated to any-
thing, except the jaded academic's search for
novelty, perhaps fuelled by a recurrent need to
extract research funds from institutional sources.
(This theme lends itself to much lofty moralising.) If
these approaches are easy to find in textbooks and
monographs in developing studies, it is no surprise
to find them much more in evidence in the views of
students who are coming new to the subject. Confu-
sion, exemplified by the hordes of dependency fana-
tics who believe implicitly in modernisation and/or
the stages of growth, and cynicism, by the host of
clever students who want to know this year's slogan
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in order to ride it to the death, are in abundant
supply.
Another problem, which afflicts students more than
teachers, though by no means them exclusively, is
the conversion syndrome. People who have been
vaguely aware of a set of issues, or who have worked
unreflectingly in a context where certain issues are
important, but who have never subjected these
issues to systematic examination, are particularly
vulnerable to the first theory that they encounter.
Once grasped, this first theory becomes the theory,
and one which continues to be held despite the
accumulation of logical objections to it. With the
conversion syndrome, the student is not confused or
cynical. His theoretical understanding is that of a
catechist who came on his particular catechism by
chance. It may have implications for his applied or
practical work, or it may not: but in either case to
leave a student in this state would be seen by most as
undesirable.
Theoretical Plurality and Order
As a corrective to all this, what is needed is an his-
torical perspective of the plurality of theories. When
teachers of development studies contemplate their
own history, they rarely look further than to 1945
[eg Streeten 1979, but cf Rimmer 1979]. Their his-
tory of the subject is the history of the evolution of
ideas and policy within the post-1945 international
organisations, the UN, the World Bank and the
IMF, of the adaption of Keynesianism to the
economic problems of post-colonial societies and of
a few alternative development strategiesSoviet
planning, the Cuban experience and Maoism. We
should, of course, be grateful for the enlightenment
that even such a grossly foreshortened perspective
brings. However, just as no-one believes that every-
thing worth seeing is viewable from roughly six feet
above the ground, it is difficult to accept that the
only history relevant to development studies has
occurred within the lifetime of the average
development studies teacher. Development studies
did not spring fully-armed from the contemporary
mind. On the contrary, the underlying assumptions
and methods of contemporary development theor-
ists have been fashioned in debates about socio-
economic development which have been actively
prosecuted over at least the last two hundred years.
What we read today are merely the latest variations
on a small stock of basic concepts with a long and
distinguished intellectual pedigree.
Mere awareness of an historical dimension to
development studies is not in itself enough. A sen-
sitivity to this dimension can still be combined with a
vision of the history of development ideas as a
patchwork quilt or as a pendulum of transient fash-
ions [Selwyn 1979]. The theoretical core of
development studies must be no less than an idea of
the development of the idea of development. This is
the minimum requirement for imposing order on the
plurality of theories.
In meeting this requirement, we are greatly helped
by recent research into what has been called, no
doubt not entirely accurately, 'the first theory of
development' [Meek 1976 but cf Edelstein 1967].
This primitive model of socio-economic develop-
mentdeveloped in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century by leading figures of the Scottish
Enlightenment, including Adam Smith, Adam Fer-
guson and John Millaridentified the mode of sub-
sistence as the determinant of socio-economic
development, outlined four stages of development
(hunting and gathering, pastoralism, settled agricul-
ture, commerce), predicted that commercial civilisa-
tion would become universal, and added the norma-
tive view that the passage 'from barbarism to
refinement' was not just a series of transitions but
progress to a desirable end. This model, by the start
of the nineteenth century, had fragmented under the
pressure of its own internal contradictions. But from
its fragments were constructed the three major trad-
itions of theorising about development which still
remain to dominate development studies today.
The three major reconstructions were the evolution-
ist, the technocratic and the Marxian. In each of
these reconstructions, an incoherent element in the
Scottish model is broken down and substituted by a
new element which could be presented as being in
some sense 'more scientific'. In the Scottish model,
for example, the idea of the mode of subsistence as a
determinant was never clearly worked through.
Usually, all that was being proposed was the weaker
view that the mode of subsistence, the level of
income and wealth, the laws and government and
the culture of any society were mutually determin-
ing, and even then, in the comparative analysis of
societies, the influence of specific environmental
factorssuch as climate and soil fertilitywere
acknowledged also as causal determinants. In the
evolutionist re-build, the new 'scientific' element
which is introduced is social Darwinism [see Bur-
rows 1966]. The environment is elevated to being
the prime determinant of socio-economic develop-
ment, to which the moral constitution of man adapts
ever more closely as a result of the process of natural
selection. The predictions and values of the Scottish
model are maintained, but it is given a different
dynamic. The contemporary bearer of the evolution-
ist view is Professor P. T. Bauer [see Bauer 1972].
The technocratic reconstruction retains the notion
of the stages of socio-economic development, but
substitutes for commercial civilisation as the final
stage the notion of scientific civilisation, in which
social organisation is dominated by the scientific
values of rationality, order, impersonality, func-
tional differentiation, calculation, etc. In this re-
build, the dynamic which the Scottish model lacked
is provided by the steady accumulation of a stock of
authentic scientific knowledge and its application to
economic reform and social engineering. The
characteristic feature of this tradition is that it aban-
dons the so-called law of unintended consequences
which was central to the Scottish model; no longer is
history viewed as 'the result of human action, but
not the execution of any human design'. On the con-
trary, men of science, both natural science and social
science, are specifically seen as a technocratic élite
who can indeed purposefully guide socio-economic
development at both the national and the interna-
tional level. The nineteenth century proponents of
these ideas were, most notably, Saint-Simon, and his
followers Bazard and Enfantin [see Markham
1954].
This technocratic tradition is the one in which most
contemporary practitioners of development studies,
at least until the recent upsurge in neo-Marxist
development studies, would have to be located. The
national planner, the visiting international develop-
ment expert, the consultant to governments, the
official of the international organisations promoting
their conception of development are still good
Saint-Simonians at heart, however much they re-
cognise the limitations on their freedom of man-
oeuvre. So are those 'neutral', 'disinterested' and
'uncommitted' researchers who make such people
the target audience of their research. Rostow, Lewis
and Myrdal could be cited as distinguished bearers
of this intellectual tradition.
The Marxian reconstruction substitutes for the
determinism of the mode of subsistence the deter-
minism of the mode of production; turns the stages
of history into the epochs of class dominance; makes
the conflicts within each mode of production (bet-
ween the forces of production and the social rela-
tions of production) the dynamic which the Scottish
model lacked; and, finally, restores the law of unin-
tended consequences by making history the product
of the struggle between classes. Here the claim of a
'more scientific' approach rests neither on a scien-
tific analogy, as in evolutionism, nor on the promise
of science as an instrument of social control, but on
the claim that a scientific sociology can be built out
of the fundamental insight that
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it is not the consciousness of men that determines
their being (but) their social being which deter-
mines their consciousness
[Marx 1971 edition: 21, and cf Seers 1979]
Despite the upsurge of neo-Marxist developmeñt
studies in the last 10 years, it is surprisingly difficult
to identify contemporary bearers of the Marxian
tradition. Baran is more correctly described as a
Marxist-Leninist, whose analysis of the prospects of
development on a world scale was heavily influ-
enced by the Leninist theory of imperialism. More
recent theorists, such as Frank and Amin, have for-
mulated theories whose anti-imperialist message is
even more radical, but whose analytical form
increasingly departs from that of Marxism. Indeed,
it reverts to that of the original Scottish model,
though as a negative to its positive [Brenner 1977].
The goal of a scientific sociology can hardly be said
to be any nearer, despite optimistic neo-Marxist
claims that the late 1960s witnessed a change of
scientific paradigm in development studies, a claim
which itself shows the durability of naïve positivism
in neo-Marxist views of social science [Foster-Carter
1976].
The above remarks about the vicissitudes which the
idea of development has itself undergone since the
eighteenth century are not intended to be at all
definitive. To go into the substance of the many and
complex theories that are relevant would be imposs-
ible in any convincing way in such a brief digression.
The aim here is merely to show the possibility of
using the methods of Ideengeschichte to provide us
with a comprehensive and rational ordering of ways
of thinking about development, and to argue that, if
there is one skill which all concerned with develop-
ment studies ought to be helped to acquire, it is the
ability to think systematically about what 'develop-
ment' might conceivably mean.
Certain intellectual problems recur in development
studies. Do we assume that development practition-
ers know in advance what type of development they
are trying to bring about? If so, where do they get
that knowledge from? Is it reasonable to expect
them to succeed? Is there only one type of develop-
ment? If there is only one end-state development,
are there many paths to it, or only one? Does work-
ing for development necessarily involve imposing
one's own view of the good life on those who have a
different view? In the end will development take
place anyway, whether we work for it or not? In
what sense can development be 'false', 'stunted' or
'underdevelopment?' A graduate student in
development studies ought to be able to answer all
of these questions both intelligently and consis-
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tently. The best way of helping him to do so is first of
all to get him to confront the theories of those writ-
ers, contemporary and historical, whose thought has
implications for the answers. The issues of valida-
tion, teleology, ethnocentricism and historicism are
there at the centre of development theory and prac-
tice. Wishing that they would go away, or modestly
denying our ability to delve into such 'philosophy',
will not save us from the traps that await those who
fail to examine with maximum ruthlessness what
they are doing and whyin development studies
just as in any other activity.
Other Core Elements: Experiences and Techni-
ques
The second and third elements of a core, being more
conventional, seem to need less justification. The
second is basically the economic, social and political
history of capitalist industrialisation, with due re-
cognition of the significance of recent episodes of
non-capitalist industrialisation. We are particularly
interested in the period since this phenomenon came
to dominate the world economy, which as Lewis
[19781 has recently pointed out, is only during the
last hundred years. In this component, the major
problem is one of achieving the right balance in
selecting topics from a vast and complex historical
field. Because of the excellent literature which exists
on a small number of key country development
experiences (cg the USSR, Japan, Mexico, and
perhaps India or China, leaving aside Europe and
North America), it is tempting to base this compo-
nent almost entirely on them. Besides the abundant
literature, a reason often given for doing this is that
only by being highly selective can the student gain a
sufficiently deep understanding of any one case.
Of course, one is against superficiality just as one is
against sin, and it is most important for students to
go deep enough to grasp the variety and specificity
of development in history. At the same time, the
impression should be avoided that national experi-
ences are relatively autonomous, operating on their
own historical tramlines. This conceptualisation
comes too close to the Rostovian picture of a series
of national 'take-offs', like an ignition sequence of
different coloured fireworks. Room must be found
for some analytic account of the interdependences in
this sequence, and of the ways in which the indus-
trialisation of one country precludes, as well as the
ways it assists, the industrialisation of others. To
fashion such an account is very difficult, but the
ingredients are easy to point to. They are the chang-
ing structure of world commerce, colonialism and
neo-colonialism, the history of capitalist monetary
arrangements and the internationalisation of pro-
duction, including the multinational firm, move-
ments of capital and international latour migration.
For all the theoretical weaknesses of neo-Marxist
writings, they have at least boldly called attention to
this neglected area of study [see Smith and Toye
1979].
The third and final element in the core which is here
proposed is practical or technical. To make this pro-
posal is not to endorse or underwrite the technocratic
tradition of development theory and thereby con-
firm the world picture of the great majority of
development studies practitioners and teachers. It
should rather be seen as a criticism of the political
theory which attaches to the Marxist tradition. This
political theory is inclined to recommend the des-
truction of capitalist society without being in posses-
sion of adequate plans for a better form of society,
economy and polity. The knowledge of what would
be better depends not just on sufficient moral
insight; it also pre-eminently requires 'the best of
human practical causal understanding' [Dunn 1979].
Specifically, one needs a soundly based assessment
of which features of human psychology, relation-
ships and institutions are the way they are because in
principle they could not be any other way, and which
have a merely contingent existence, and thus are
potentially reconstructable. Marxism as a political
doctrine combines, in an intellectually opportunistic
way, extremely different judgements on human
social plasticity. The evidence for this in develop-
ment studies is the embarrassingly large number of
socialist authors who have had to follow their books
or articles on 'The Transition to Socialism in Some-
place' with a sequel entitled 'Socialism in Some-
place: the End of an Illusion'.
The practical element in the core of development
studies must be informed by the question, what
techniques of social analysis and social decision
would be relevant to any coherently imaginable set
of social arrangements? Let us take 'development
banking' as an example. At present, opinions tend to
divide as follows on the desirability of teaching the
principles of banking for development. On one side
stand those who support it, either as an affirmation
of capitalist values or as an instrument for improved
social control within the existing structure of society.
On the other side stand those who oppose it,
because they do not wish such values to be affirmed
or social control in existing society to be improved,
and who presumably think that banking, perhaps
even money itself, can be removed from the agenda
of future socialist construction. Kampuchea is not a
good exemplar of the prudence of that assumption.
Other topics whose teaching is bedevilled by the
same conflict could be readily listedproject
appraisal, taxation, public expenditure control, land
reform, incomes policy, balance of payments man-
agement, education, health care and so on.
To refuse to teach what little we know of the techni-
cal aspects of these subjects on the grounds that the
knowledge we have inherited is ideologically tainted
and practically abused, as indeed it is, seems both
arrogant and foolhardy. On the other hand, to teach
it in its conventional form does imply consent to the
ideological meanings it carries and the uses to which
it is put. The correct course then is to teach tech-
niques for the purpose of exposing the extent to
which they depend on unacceptable moral or factual
assumptions, and of salvaging what might be neces-
sary in a future social order. The conflict between
'red' and 'expert' which surfaced in China during its
period of socialist construction illustrates the politi-
cal power which attaches to expertise. Only by
appropriating, criticising and reconstructing techni-
cal knowledge in its most advanced form can that
power be unified with the power that arises from a
genuine moral authority.
Clearly, not all the techniques and practical skills
which it is desirable to treat in this way can be
accommodated in the technical element of the core.
Most would have to be dealt with in the optional
papers of a postgraduate course, the economic
topics which have been cited in the economics
options, the social topics in the social options, and so
on. In the core, the central organising question
should be that of the possibilities of public policy, or
of the room for manoeuvre of public authorities to
formulate and carry out effective development
policies. This can be approached by an examination
both of general techniques of policy coordination
derived from economics (macro-planning, project
appraisal, programme budgeting, regional planning)
and from theories of organisation, administration
and management; and of micro-level interventions
which, because of their scale or relatively self-
contained nature, side-step the problem of rational
policy coordination.
It is certainly true that development practitioners
have, over the last 30 years, come to make increas-
ingly sober, indeed pessimistic, estimates of the pos-
sibilities of comprehensive policy interventions
[Seers 1972, 1979a]. As a result, discussions of
development strategies have shifted in emphasis
from the organised sector to the unorganised, from
industrial projects to agricultural, from giantism to
the beautifully small, from centralised direction to
decentralised initiatives and from the accumulation
of fixed capital to the development of human skills.
These shifts reflect a particular, currently popular,
answer to the question of what public policy can and
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should do. But this answer should not be taught as a
new conventional wisdom. It is after all, predicated
on the existence of the typical institutions of proto-
capitalist mixed economies located in an imperfect
international system. While one wants students who
are able to recognise the restrictions imposed on
public policy by exising institutions (because people
who batter brick walls with their heads tend to per-
manently impair their capacity to think), one also
wants students who can estimate realistically what
restrictions on public policy would remain under any
possible alternative set of institutions. We need to
know what it is that any rational development prac-
tice must take account of, and what are the limits on
the rational coordination of policy interventions as
such.
Conclusion
The conclusions of this paper can be readily summed
up Iti designing a postgraduate course in develop-
meøt studies, one should begin by clearing one's
mind of the merely prudential considerations which
in fact affect educational planning (student prefer-
ences, the group psychology of teachers, policies of
grant-giving bodies, supply and demand in the mar-
ket for postgraduate degrees and so on). This is not
in order to forget them, but to bring them back to
their proper place, as constraints on a pedagogy
which stands full square on its own intrinsic intellec-
tual merits. If one is prepared to be directive at all at
the postgraduate level, and there are special argu-
ments in the case of development studies for being
so, the answer to the question whether a core or a
cafeteria organisation is to be preferred in teaching
turns solely on whether one thinks that the field of
study does have an identifiable fixed centre. This
immediately opens up fundamental issues which
have to be argued through as well as one can. The
ideas which have been sketched out here point to a
core of three elements, essentially a philosophical
exploration of the concept of development as it has
developed since it became recognisable as such; an
historical element focused both on national
development experiences and the changing interna-
tional nexus to which they were related; and a tech-
nical appraisal of the nature and limits of coordi-
nated policy intervention. Whether these sketches
carry conviction in whole or in part must be pro-
nounced on by others.
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